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ABSTRACT
Smart grid empowers home owners to e!ciently manage their
smart home appliances within a Home Area Network (HAN), by
real timemonitoring and "ne-grained control. However, it o#ers the
possibility for a malicious user to intrude into the HAN and deceive
the smart metering system with fraudulent energy usage report.
While most of the existing works have focused on how to prevent
data tampering in HAN’s communication channel, this paper looks
into a relatively less studied security aspect namely data provenance.
We propose a novel solution based on Shamir’s secret sharing and
threshold cryptography to guarantee that the reported energy usage
is collected from the speci!c appliance as claimed at a particular
location, and that it re"ects the real consumption of the energy. A
byproduct of the proposed security solution is a guarantee of data
integrity. A prototype implementation is presented to demonstrate
the feasibility and practicality of the proposed solution.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The growing demand of electricity power and the drive towards a
low-carbon economy have urged the electricity services industry to
develop an innovative energymanagement solutionwhich canmeet
the user’s demand for power as well as to increase the e!ciency
of energy distribution and usage. Smart grid therefore emerged
to replace the traditional grid system to report real-time energy
consumption and support "ne-grained customer monitoring and
control, hence providing the users with better control and more
e!cient management of their daily consumption.
Smart grid system relies heavily on information and communi-
cations technologies (ICT) for establishing communications among
its components including smart home appliances, smart meters and
utility providers. The security of smart grid [1, 13] has drawn a big
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attention to researchers from both academia and industry due to
massive challenges posed by cyber-security threats [3, 12].
In October 2014, smart meters in Spain were hacked to cut power
bills [20], where the attackers made use of leaked encryption keys
and unique identi"er associated with the smart meter to spoof
messages sent from home appliances to utility to under-report
energy usage. Additionally, the unique identi"er can be spoofed by
using another household’s smart meter identity which resulted in
fraudulent energy usage to be reported for "nancial gains. With
such an inadequate protection against tampering and weak security,
adversaries can easily make use of these exploits to attack the smart
grid infrastructure.
This paper aims to investigate all aspects of data provenance
and thus can be considered as the "rst paper to comprehensively
study data provenance related attacks in a home energy monitoring
networks. There are many attacks that can be launched to commit
energy fraud: Firstly, the smart meter can be compromised to under-
report the energy used in a household. Though the hardware of
the smart meter can be hardened, it would be more e#ective to
reliably monitor and measure the real power consumption at every
power outlet in the house using smart plugs. This approach aims to
re%ect the true energy use which can then be cross-checked with
the energy consumption recorded by the smart meter. With this,
any discrepancy between the two readings can be detected and
energy fraud is suspected.
However, it is also important to ensure the security of the smart
plugs, Firstly (1) a compromised smart plug may tamper with the
energy reading before sending it to the smart meter. This breaches
the data source authenticity as the measurement itself has already
been tampered with at the smart plug prior to data transmission.
(2) Secondly, a smart plug’s device identity may also be spoofed,
by masquerading as other smart plugs to send out fraudulent en-
ergy reading. (3) Replay attacks can be potentially exploited by an
impersonated smart plug to send a previously reported energy data.
We consider all the above challenges together as data provenance
issues in a home energy monitoring network. This paper proposes
a novel solution based on Shamir’s secret sharing and threshold
cryptography to guarantee that the reported energy usage is col-
lected from the speci!c appliance as claimed, and that it re"ects the
real consumption of the energy. Speci"cally, the proposed solution
contributes to achieving the following security goals:
(1) Source Identity Authenticity – ensures that the energy
data is originated from the smart plug as claimed.
(2) Source Data Authenticity – means that the energy con-
sumption measured by the smart plug on each power outlet
re%ects the real consumption.
(3) Data Integrity – guarantees that the data transmitted from
the smart plug to the smart meter is not tampered with.
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(4) Data Consistency – ensures that there is no discrepancy
between the energy consumption recorded by the smart
meter and the aggregated data from the smart plugs.
(5) Location Authenticity – ensures that the energy data is
collected from the location of the power outlet as stated.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide details
on the background, followed by related work and some preliminary
knowledge. Our detailed solution is presented in Section 3 and the
implementation environment is presented in Section 4. We present
the initial performance analysis in Section 5. We conclude the paper
with future work and discussion in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Smart Grid and HAN
2.1.1 Smart Grid. A smart grid is an electric grid which inte-
grates power generation, transmission, distribution and consump-
tion using information communication network technologies [10].
One of the key characteristics of a smart grid is the support of
bi-directional information %ow between the consumer and utility
provider to create an automated and distributed advanced energy
delivery network [6]. This also allows electricity to be generated in
real-time based on consumers’ demands and power requests. The
addition of innovative sensing and control systems enables smart
grid to be capable of performing real time monitoring of power
%ows thus in turn providing better information about optimization
and forecasting of power usage [16].
To realize this, an AdvancedMetering Infrastructure (AMI) based
on smart meters is the most critical technology required to allow
transmission of information in the communication network. A
smart meter is de"ned as an advanced meter that performs mea-
surement of the energy consumption in deeper details compared
to a conventional meter and it periodically sends the collected in-
formation back to the utility company for load monitoring and
billing purposes. Prior to that, the data (energy usage) collected
from the smart meter is also important for control centre (utility)
to implement a demand and response mechanism.
With these powerful features available, it also brings numerous
security concerns, e.g., this enables new ways to commit energy
fraud, perform large scale attacks to cripple power supply to con-
sumers which could be di!cult to address in this emerging system.
2.1.2 Home Area Network (HAN). A home area network (HAN)
is a subsystem within the smart grid which extends smart grid
capabilities into the home using di#erent networking protocols.
HAN is typically found in consumer premises and it connects home
(smart) appliances such as thermostats, refrigerators and other
electrical devices to a smart meter. A HAN typically relies on a
wireless link such as WiFi, ZigBee to communicate with the smart
meter via a gateway. The gateway also acts as a bridge between
the smart meter and the smart appliances in consumer’s home.
The smart meter collects energy usage data, network status from
the utility for display to the consumer. Moreover, the smart meter
also forwards demand/response and energy-pricing signals to the
smart appliances for their information. This forms a home energy
monitoring network at home.
However, this also makes HAN one of the most vulnerable sys-
tems in the smart grid because the wireless communication is being
located in a physically insecure environment. It is possible for an
attacker to intercept and monitor network tra!c to gain sensitive
information across the wireless communication.
In addition to HAN, Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) is
formed through meshing of smart meters and data concentrators
in an area in order to conserve bandwidth. NAN ensures smooth
communication links between a number of individual smart meters
and a data concentrator using WiMAX, Wi-Fi or cellular technolo-
gies and Wi-SUN. A number of data concentrators are connected
to a central system in the utility side through Wide Area Network.
2.2 Related Work
Aman et al. proposed to use Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) to
secure data provenance in IoT Systems [2]. PUFs are used to protect
the identity of an IoT device, thus providing physical security to en-
able an IoT device to be identi"ed uniquely in the network. Device
identity is thus guaranteed using PUF, additionally the location
authenticity of the IoT device is preserved by using the wireless
link’s Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) values as unique
"ngerprints. However, this research did not have any implementa-
tion and analysis to demonstrate the practicality of the approach,
and it does not guarantee the source data authenticity.
Jiang et al. introduced an energy-theft detection scheme [11]
for AMI using a machine learning approach. Classi"cation-based
technique is used by incorporating statistical learning theory to
classify the load pro"les of customer’s abnormal behaviour in or-
der to detect energy-theft suspects. This is complemented by a
state-based detection method that monitors events derived from
the network and AMI Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in order
to perform mutual inspection, and event correlation, thus vastly
improving the detection rate. Yet, all these detection schemes still
do not address fundamental issue of hardware tampering where
the energy consumption data is tampered with at its source.
In [19], data provenance research addresses the issue of tracking
the information for data accountability. The existing literature re-
lates data provenance to integrity or tamper-evident, authenticity
and reliable data collection. Kairos [7] explored the authenticity
of provenance records in a grid computing environment with a
time-stamp authority to generate a tamper-evident proof through
the use of a user digital signature. Bonsai [9] proposed an addi-
tion of digital signatures of users or operators to the provenance
records whereby veri"cation is executed only when requested by
users for authenticity of provenance records. Boyen et al. [5] in-
troduced a bi-linear pairing technique to uphold the properties of
tamper-evident and con"dentiality in provenance records so that
provenance information can then be trusted. Lyle et al. suggested
the use of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to tackle the issue of
reliability [14], whereby the hardware is made tamper-resistant.
2.3 Preliminary
This section presents some fundamental knowledge which will be
used in future sections of this paper.
2.3.1 RSA Cryptosystem. RSA Cryptosystem, one of the most
utilized public-key cryptosystems, can be used to ensure that the
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message was indeed from the sender and not tampered with during
the transmission. An RSA cryptosystem consists of three steps as
below:
(1) Key Generation: An RSA key pair (PK , SK) is generated:
PK = (n, e) is the public key and SK = d is the private
key. For security consideration, (PK , SK) must satisfy the
following requirements ( ϕ = (p− 1) ∗ (q− 1) ): n = p ∗q with
p,q randomly chosen big primes; 1 ≤ e ≤ ϕ, gcd (e,ϕ) = 1;
d ∗ e ≡ 1 mod ϕ.
(2) Signature Generation: For a messagem, the sender gener-
ates the signature c as c ≡me mod n.
(3) Signature Veri!cation: Upon receiving a messagem and
its signature c , the receiver veri"es that: cd ≡m mod n.
Only the sender who possesses the private key SK = d is able to
generate the valid signature which in turn proves that the message
m was indeed sent by the sender as claimed.
2.3.2 (k,N) Threshold Secret Sharing and (k,N,SK) RSA Private
Key Share Generation. Secret-sharing schemes (SSS) were "rst in-
troduced in 1979 by Blakley [4] and Shamir [17] and used in many
cryptographic protocols. The main idea of classical secret sharing
is dividing a secret amongst a group of participants, where each is
allocated a share of the secret. The secret can only be reconstructed
when the shares are combined together from certain authorized
groups of shares. Typically, in a (k,N ) threshold secret sharing
scheme, a minimum of k out of the total N shares are required
to reconstruct the secret. An example of (k,N ) threshold secret
sharing is polynomial-based Shamir Secret Sharing.
In this work, we take the RSA private key SK as the secret and
exploit Shamir Secret Sharing scheme to split the secret into shares
among the participants. Details of generating the secret shares for
RSA private key is presented in Figure 1.
- Input: SK, k, N where SK is the RSA private key, N is the total number of
participants and k is the minimum number of participants who are allowed
to recover SK .
- Output: s = s1, · · · , sN where si is computed by si = f (i) with
f (i) = SK + a1 ∗ i + ... + ak−1 ∗ (i)
k−1
Here, ai (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) are randomly chosen unknown elements of Zp .
Figure 1: (k,N , SK) RSA Private Key Share Generation.
2.3.3 (k,N,m,s) RSA Threshold Signature Scheme. This scheme is
built upon Shoup’s practical threshold scheme [18]. It allows a total
ofN participants to generate a partial RSA signatures on messagem
individually using their respective RSA private key share computed
as described in Figure 1, where a minimum of k partial signatures
are required to be combined to generate the full RSA signature on
m. The veri"cation of the full signature in this scheme is the same
as the veri"cation of standard RSA signature as shown in Section
2.3.1. Detail of this scheme is shown in Figure 2. Note that input s is
the collection of RSA private key shares resulted from the (k,N , SK)
RSA Private Key Share Generation.
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
This paper proposes to design an integrated device to be deployed in
HAN to securely and accurately measure the energy consumption
- Partial-Signature-Generation (m, i, s): Given x = Hash(m) from message
m, the partial signature for signer (entity) i is generated as follows:
xi = x
2∆si ∈ Qn, ∆ = N !
where Qn is the subgroup of squares in Z
∗
n
- Full-Signature-Generation (τx ): For a set τx of entities, where τx ={
xi1, ...., xik
}
⊂
{
xi1, ...., xiN
}
. Let x = Hash(m) ∈ Z ∗n and assume
that x 2ij
= x
4∆sij . The Full RSA Signature FS for messagem, can be gener-
ated as:
FS = waxb .
Here a and b are integers such that e ′a+eb = 1with e ′ = 4∆2 and gcd(e ′, e)
= 1;w is computed as:
w = x
2λ
τx
0,i1
i1
... x
2λ
τx
0,ik
ik
,
where the λ’s are the integers de"ned as:
λ
τx
i, j = ∆
Πj′∈τx \{j }(i − j
′)
Πj′∈τx \{j }(j − j
′)
∈ Z
- Full-Signature-Veri!cation (m, FS, PK ): A veri"er checks whether the
following equation holds: FSe ≡m mod n. If it holds then veri"cation passes,
otherwise the veri"cation fails.
Figure 2: (k,N,m,s) RSA Threshold Signature Scheme.
data, and then implement a two-phase communication protocol in
order to ful"ll all the security goals as de"ned in Section 1.
The most challenging goal to achieve is source data authenticity
in a home energy monitoring network. We introduce cross-check
validation in our scheme, ensuring that two or more independent
and co-located energy monitoring devices measure the energy con-
sumption at a power outlet simultaneously and subsequently send
the energy data to the designated smart meter periodically. In this
way, any sign of discrepancy between themeasuring devices implies
that there is a potential tampering with the energy data. As these
devices are di#erent in nature, tampering with one device does
not imply that the other device can be tampered with in the same
manner, thus providing reliability and robustness in our system.
This work exploits a novel magnetic sensor [8] that is co-located
with the smart plug as a redundant measuring device to collect a
home appliance’s energy usage simultaneously but independently
from the smart plug. The energy value drawn from the magnetic
sensor (i.e., v1), is used to cross-check with the value reported by
the smart plug (i.e., v2). The source data authenticity at a power
outlet is thus achieved if v1 ≈ v2; the source data authenticity is
breached if v1 0 v2 (which means either the smart plug or the
magnetic sensor is sending fraudulent energy reading).
Since our scheme makes use of the magnetic sensor’s inputs for
cross-checking, it is imperative to ensure the integrity of the data
sent from the magnetic sensor to the smart meter, and thus, a tag is
necessarily generated by the magnetic sensor using its own private
credential (this is similar to the case of smart plug). Therefore,
a private credential is required for both the smart plug and the
magnetic sensor. In case that tampering is detected, it is unclear
which device is the dishonest one if a symmetric-key scheme is
used. Conversely, with a public-key scheme, it is risky to let the
smart plug and magnetic sensor to generate their own private keys,
because any compromised device can create fake data with a valid
tag if the full private-key is known.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Ming Hong Chia, Sye Loong Keoh, and Zhaohui Tang
Figure 3: The Secure Smart Plug (SSP) periodically sends pro-
tected energy consumption data to the Smart Meter
In this paper, we introduce a novel use of secret sharing scheme
in home energy monitoring networks, where a secret, i.e., a single
private key, is split among all the participants providing measure-
ment of the energy consumption. In addition to the smart plug and
the magnetic sensor, our scheme is concerned with the location
authenticity, thus a location generator is included as an additional
participant. The location generator uses the trilateration technique
built on the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) values and
RSSI "ltering methodology to verify the location of the device, en-
suring that the correct power source is being monitored and any
relocation of the device can be detected. In our current implemen-
tation, we further assume that the location generator is fully trusted
to report the location of the device. In total, there are three partici-
pants sharing a single private key for each energy measurement
point: smart plug, magnetic sensor, and location generator.
The private key is split into multiple shares between the three
entities such that it allows the combination of location generator
and smart plug to recover the private key, and similarly permits
the combination of location generator and magnetic sensor to recon-
struct the key; however, a collusion between the smart plug and the
magnetic sensor is prohibited from recovering the private key. Based
on this requirement, our scheme adopts threshold secret sharing
which means a minimum number (i.e., threshold, k) of shares are
required to reconstruct the secret (the single key) successfully. In
essence, our scheme ensures that the energy data received from the
smart plug and the magnetic sensor are considered authentic if they
can each produce k partial signatures from itself and the location
generator, which can then be combined into a full valid signature.
The location generator in this scheme will only produce a partial
signature if and only if the location of the device is authentic, i.e.,
not relocated. As a result, if the full signature can be combined
and then veri"ed, it means that the energy consumption data is
produced by an authentic device, measured at the designated loca-
tion without any sign of tampering. Therefore, ful"lling the source
identity authenticity and location authenticity requirements.
3.1 Secure Smart Plug (SSP)
We propose a device called Secure Smart Plug (SSP) which is essen-
tially an integration of three individual components: Smart Plug,
Bluetooth Location Generator, Magnetic Sensor to accurately mea-
sure the energy usage and to ensure location authenticity. The SSP
Figure 4: Commissioning of SSP to facilitateRSAPrivateKey
Share Distribution
is typically located inside indoor environment to connect home
appliances and reports the energy consumption to smart meter, SM .
Figure 3 illustrates the various entities in the home energy moni-
toring network. The SSP is deployed in HAN environment to gather
and report the electricity consumption of a smart home appliance
e.g., a smart refrigerator, to the smart meter. The following describes
the entities in the proposed system:
(1) SM – denotes the Smart Meter in a HAN.
(2) SSP – denotes the Secure Smart Plug, which consists of three
components, namely (1) Smart Plug (SP) that is used to mea-
sure the energy consumption of a smart home appliance. (2)
Bluetooth Location Generator (BT) to identify and determine
the location information of the SSP. (3)Magnetic Sensor (MS),
as an alternative medium to measure the energy usage of
the smart home appliance.
(3) Smart Home Appliance – any specialized device that con-
sumes electricity, and that its energy consumption can be
measured by the SSP.
The proposed scheme operates in two-phases. First, in the com-
missioning phase, the SSPs are installed in the HAN, and each of
them is commissioned so that credentials can be pre-loaded or con-
"gured. Second, the operational phasewill allow the SSP to securely
measure the energy consumption of the smart appliance and pro-
vide location authenticity guarantee to the smart meter through
the use of RSA Threshold Signature Scheme (Section 2.3.3).
3.2 Commissioning of SSP and Smart Meter
In this phase, the SSP is commissioned prior to the operation. There
are two part of commissioning: RSA Private Key Share Distribution ,
and Location Registration for SSP .
3.2.1 RSA Private Key Share Distribution. Each SSP is provi-
sioned with a private key, as requiring each individual component
in the SSP to have a private-key each is too heavyweight. Addi-
tionally, by splitting the private key into multiple shares and then
distributing them to the three components of SSP can prevent the
compromise of the private-key.
Figure 4 illustrates the key deployment and RSA private key
share distribution. In this phase, the SM is responsible to "rstly
generate an RSA Key Pair (PK and SK), and thereafter, to execute
(3, 4, SK) RSA Private Key Generation (as described in Figure 1). We
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Figure 5: Commissioning of SSP for location registration
advocate that the SK is split into four shares for each SSP such that
s = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and then distribute the shares to the three entities
in SSP : s1 for SP, s2 and s3 for BT, and s4 for MS. The allocated
share(s) will be used in the Operational Phase by the three entities
to generate their partial RSA signatures respectively.
3.2.2 Location Registration. Our scheme relies on Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) beacons to be deployed in order to determine
the location of the SSP . The SSP indoor location can be accurately
determined on the basis of three known reference points from the
BLE beacons using Trilateration Scheme as shown in Figure 5.
The Trilateration technique illustrated in Figure 5 is based on
the RSSI measurement of the three deployed Bluetooth beacons,
to calculate the estimated distance of the SSP from each beacon.
The location registration is built upon the RSSI "ltering methodol-
ogy [15]. This is constructed on the basis of three reference nodes
with the known position coordinates of the beacons identi"er char-
acteristics (MAJOR and RSSI) and the known dimension of length x
and width y in an indoor environment. Once the deployed location
of the SSP is registered, the BT component of the SSP is responsible
to ensure that whenever an energy consumption is measured by
the SP orMS , it must ensure that the location of the SSP is veri"ed
using the same trilateration technique.
3.3 Operational Phase
During the operational phase, energy reading is reported by each
SSP to the SM periodically. Each SP andMS in the SSP is respon-
sible for measuring the energy consumption to be reported inde-
pendently, while the BT is responsible for verifying that the SSP ’s
location is authentic and has not been re-located. The energy con-
sumption data is partially signed using the RSA Threshold Signature
Scheme by the SSP , thus ensuring data integrity and authenticity,
as well as location authenticity.
The following shows the steps during the Operational Phase to
facilitate the reporting of energy consumption to the SM , and we
assume that the communication between the three components in
SSP are encrypted.
Step 1: Measure Energy Reading and Verify SSP ’s Location.
The three entities of SP , MS and BT execute Step 1 concurrently
with speci"c details given below.
• Step 1-SP: SP measures the home appliance’s energy con-
sumption rsp and sends a concatenated message
msp = (SP , rsp , tsp )
to SM and BT where SP is the identity, and tsp is a timestamp
at which the energy reading rsp is recorded.
• Step 1-MS: Similar to SP , MS in Step 1 extracts the home
appliance’s energy reading rms and sends
mms = (ms, rms , tms )
to SM and BT . The message mms contains the electricity
consumption measured and sent to SM at the time of tms
and its value is rms .
• Step 1-BT: When SP reports the energy reading, BT is re-
sponsible to verify whether SP ’s location remains the same
as registered in the Commissioning Phase. If the veri"cation
shows that the location of SP remains, BT will continue with
Step 2-BT; otherwise it will terminate the processing.
Step 2: Generate Partial RSA Signatures. In order to prevent
the message containing the energy consumption from being tam-
pered with during transmission, all three entities SP ,MS , and BT
are each required to generate and send SM their respective partial
signature(s) based on their individual RSA private key share(s). The
message containing the reported energy consumption is signed us-
ing the algorithm Partial-Signature-Generation as shown previously
in Figure 2. All these partial RSA signatures will then be veri"ed
by the SM in Step 3.
• Step 2-SP: To preventmsp (refer to Step 1-SP) from being
tamperedwith, SP in Step 2 generates a partial RSA signature,
denoted as x1, based onmsp and its RSA private key share
s1, by running
x1 = Partial-Signature-Generation(msp , 1, s)
• Step 2-MS: Similarly, MS signs its messagemms (resulted
from Step 1-MS) by computing its partial RSA signature x ′
1
,
using its RSA private key share s4, by running:
x ′
1
= Partial-Signature-Generation(mms , 4, s)
• Step 2-BT: Note that BT receives messages from both SP
(i.e.,msp ) andMS (i.e.,mms ). It is responsible to partially sign
their messages. Formsp , BT generates two partial signatures
x2,x3 using the two RSA secret shares it received from SM
as:
x2 = Partial-Signature-Generation(msp , 2, s)
x3 = Partial-Signature-Generation(msp , 3, s)
Similarly, formms , BT generates the corresponding two par-
tial signatures x ′
2
,x ′
3
as:
x ′
2
= Partial-Signature-Generation(mms , 2, s)
x ′
3
= Partial-Signature-Generation(mms , 3, s)
Step 3: Verify Data Integrity & Source Data Authenticity. In
this step, SM is required to verify the data integrity of messages
received from SP andMS (in Step 1), and source data authenticity
of the energy consumption report. The algorithms used in this Step
are Full-Signature-Generation and Full-Signature-Veri!cation, which
have been described in Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 6: Environmental Setup
• Step 3-SP: Upon receiving the partial signature x1 from
SP and the other two partial signatures (x2 and x3) from
BT (which implies that the location of SP is authentic), SM
combines all the three partial signatures to generate a full
RSA signature FSSP on SP ’s messagemsp by:
FSsp = Full-Signature-Generation(x1,x2,x3)
Afterwards, SM veri"es FSsp using the RSA public key PK ,
Full-Signature-Veri!cation (msp , FSsp , PK) to check the au-
thenticity and integrity of themsp .
If veri"cation is successful, then the protocol proceeds to Step
3-MS; otherwise it terminates and stops further veri"cation.
• Step 3-MS: Similarly, upon receiving the partial signature
x ′
1
fromMS and two partial signatures (x ′
2
and x ′
3
) from BT ,
SM combines them into a full RSA signature FSms , as:
FSms = Full-Signature-Generation(x
′
1
,x ′
2
,x ′
3
)
The full signature is then veri"ed by SM to ensure data
integrity and authenticity.
• Step 3-SM: Finally, in order to check whether there is any
sign of data tampering at the source, it is important to ensure
that both energy consumption reading reported by both SP
and MS are approximately the same. SM checks whether
rsp ≈ rms (recall that rsp is one part ofmsp and rms is one
part of mms ). If rsp ≈ rms , then SM is ensured that the
energy reading is authentic; otherwise the energy reading
should not be trusted and could well be tampered with at its
source.
In this way, the smart meter has a good overview of the energy
usage from all the power outlets in the household. Similarly, the
utility will be able to determine whether there is any energy theft
occurring outside the household if the recorded energy usage di#ers
from the smart meter’s measurement.
4 PROTOTYPE & IMPLEMENTATION
We have successfully implemented a Java prototype to demonstrate
the feasiblity of the proposed solution. This section provides de-
tails on the measurement of energy consumption, implementation
details of RSA Threshold Signature Scheme and the location veri"-
cation strategy using Estimote Bluetooth beacons.
As shown in Figure 6, the deployed environment was a room
consisting of two Secure Smart Plug (SSP) measuring the energy
consumption at di#erent power outlets, three Estimote Bluetooth
beacons for determining the location of SSP, as well as a Smart Meter
(SM) to collect the energy consumption report from the SSP viaWiFi.
We consider each household to have the same environmental setup
in order to secure the data provenance and location authenticity.
4.1 Measurement of Energy Consumption
We used a Raspberry Pi 3 to act as the SSP in this prototype. The
Smart Plug (SP) component in the SSPwas a DLink DSP-W215Wi-Fi
Smart Plug that draws energy consumption readings in Kilowatt-
hour (kWh). The reading was communicated periodically to the
SSP, so that the energy data can be protected and then sent to SM
for real-time monitoring.
As we do not currently have access to a magnetic sensor, as
proof-of-concept prototype the Raspberry Pi acting as the SSP was
also used to simulate the Magnetic Sensor (MS) component in the
SSP, thus providing an alternate energy consumption reading to
the SP. As the Raspberrry Pi 3 has a Bluetooth chip onboard, it
also acted as the Location Generator (BT) component in the SSP (c.f.
Section 4.3 for details on location authenticity veri"cation).
4.2 Cryptographic Operations
As a proof-of-concept prototype, we implemented the Shamir Se-
cret Sharing (SSS) Scheme and RSA Threshold Signature Scheme
using Java Cryptographic Architecture (JCA). The SSS was used
in the commissioning phase to split an RSA private key into four
secret shares for each SSP in the deployment. The RSA Threshold
Signature scheme was used in the operational phase to allow for
components in the SSP to generate partial signatures, and subse-
quently enabling the SM to combine the relevant partial signatures
into a full signature for veri"cation.
The current implementation assumes that the communication
between the components in the SSP are protected. We advocate
that for real deployment, SSP would be an integrated device with
secure bus communication between the SP , MS , and BT , so that
when relaying energy consumption data (msp ,mms ) between SP
and BT , as well as betweenMS and BT , they cannot be tampered
with by the attacker through hardware attacks.
4.3 Location Veri!cation Strategy
As described in Section 3.2.2, during the commissioning phase, the
location of the deployed SSP is "rst registered. In the operational
phase, for each energy consumption reading to be sent by the SSP ,
the location of the SSP at which the energy consumption reading
was measured must be validated against the registered location.
Our implementation relied on the deployment of three Estimote
Bluetooth beacons to accurately determine the location of SSP
using trilateration method. We observed that the the %uctuation
of Bluetooth RSSI signals a#ects precision of the location of SSP ,
and therefore we developed an innovative idea by de"ning a border
boundary and the nearest beacon found for each SSP . As shown
in Figure 7, the BT component in the SSP , i.e., the Raspberry Pi 3
device "rst uses trilateration to determine the coordinate of the
SSP , ensuring that the detected coordinate falls within the de"ned
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Figure 7: Location Veri!cation Approach
border boundary of the SSP , and that the beacon closest to SSP is
the same as the nearest beacon found.
With this, if the SSP had been re-located to another household
in order to commit energy fraud, this can be easily detected by
BT because the detected location would not fall within the border
boundary, and it is highly likely that the nearest beacon found will
not be the same as the one recorded. In most cases, the signals
from the beacons may not even be found if re-located to another
household next door.
Once the BT has veri"ed that the SSP ’s location information is
authentic, the BT will then produce two valid partial signatures to
con"rm the location authenticity and send the partial signatures to
SM . Thus, guaranteeing that the SSP has not been moved.
Finally, it is important that this Location Generator, BT is always
executed correctly to guarantee location authenticity. We advocate
that the SSP itself must be further integrated with a secure and
tamper-resistant hardware module such as a TPM, and then use a
secure bootloader to ensure the integrity of the application has not
been compromised.
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
There are various factors that in%uence and contribute to the overall
performance of any system such as functionality requirements,
operation costs and reliability of the program. However, e!ciency is
no doubt one of the greatest concerns inmeasuring the performance
of information security system as it is infeasible to deploy a security
application which is computationally expensive. Hence, the time
taken and memory consumption are used in this section to evaluate
the e!ciency of the proposed scheme.
5.1 Time E"ciency
The computational cost of the proposed scheme was evaluated. In
particular, we investigated the cost incurred in both the Commis-
sioning Phase and the Operational Phase.
5.1.1 Commissioning Phase: Computational Time. The Commis-
sioning Phase consists of three main tasks to be undertaken by the
SM , namely: RSA keypair generation, splitting of RSA private key
and distribution of key shares to SSP . Figure 8 shows the compu-
tational time incurred for these three tasks for various key sizes
Figure 8: The computational time incurred in the Commis-
sioning Phase for various key sizes
(512-bit, 1024-bit, and 2048-bit) on a laptop serving as SM . It is
noteworthy that it took 1172 ms to generate a pair of 1024-bit RSA
keypair, and the computational time increased signi"cantly when
the key size is increased to 2048-bit. In terms of key share gen-
eration, the cost of performing Shamir Secret Share generation
is rather constant for all three key sizes. The distribution of four
secret-shares to the SSP takes around 16709 ms, and an increase in
the key size does not a#ect the results.
It is worthwhile to mention that commissioning is a one-time
operation at the SM (instead of SSP ) in the proposed solution, there-
fore, the total time required to complete all three tasks does not
a#ect the practicality of the solution even if the SSP may be con-
strained in computational capability.
5.1.2 Operational Phase: Partial Signature Generation. All the
components in SSP are required to generate partial signatures dur-
ing the Operational Phase in order to guarantee data provenance
and location authenticity of the SSP . For each energy reading to
be reported, six partial signatures are generated in the proposed
solution. We tested the performance of our partial RSA signature
generation scheme on Raspberry Pi 3, which is assumed to have low
processing power. Furthermore, the limited processing power is
also an important factor to examine whether the security protocol
can operate e!ciently in such environment.
Table 1: Time taken to generate a partial signature
Entity SP , BT orMS
Key Size (bits) 512 1024 2048
Average (ms) 148.33 863.67 6419
Table 1 presents the time taken to compute a partial signature
on a short message comprising [timestamp, device id, energy data]
for di#erent key length. The partial signature generation process
was executed three times using di#erent secret shares and the cor-
responding time incurred was recorded. This is to evaluate whether
the partial signature generation algorithm is computationally feasi-
ble and to ascertain the e#ect on the required time when the RSA
private key size increases. From the results shown in Table 1, the
algorithm to generate partial signature indicates that the computa-
tional cost increases as the key size increases. The computational
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Table 2: Time taken to combine partial signatures
Entity SM
Key Size (bits) 512 1024 2048
Average Time (ms) 5 8.33 18.33
time required increases signi"cantly especially when the 2048-bit
key was used. This is mainly attributed to the limited computational
power of the Raspberry Pi 3 acting as the SSP . Having said that,
it appears to be reasonable to use a 1024-bit key length, as it only
incurred around 860 ms to generate a partial signature.
5.1.3 Operational Phase: Full Signature Generation. Similarly,
for every reported energy consumption reading, the SM needs to
verify its provenance by "rst combining the relevant partial signa-
tures into a full RSA signature. We conducted performance tests to
investigate the computational time required for this operation with
three di#erent RSA key sizes. The tests were executed on a laptop
simulating the SM . The intention to identify whether the operation
follows the same manner as it was on Partial RSA Signature Gener-
ation (as shown in Section 5.1.2) where time is a#ected by key size.
This also allows more su!cient performance evaluation in order to
determine the implemented security protocol is feasible to deploy
on limited processing power environment.
Table 2 illustrates the time taken to combine three partial signa-
tures into a full RSA signature. We observe that the computation
required and time incurred were not much a#ected signi"cantly by
the key sizes. However, when running these tests on a Raspberry Pi
3 (which has lower computational power), the computational time
required appears to be reasonable, e.g., combining partial signatures
generated using a share of 1024-bit key, it took approximately 40
ms as compared to 8 ms on a laptop.
5.1.4 Operational Phase: Signature Verification. Table 3 shows
the time taken in the Operational Phase to verify the combined
full RSA signature on SM . Results show that the veri"cation is
signi"cantly more computational intensive than combining partial
signatures.
Table 3: Time Incurred for Signature Veri!cation
Entity SM
Key Size (bits) 512 1024 2048
Signature Veri!cation (ms) 132 157 875
6 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
This paper investigated the data provenance and location authen-
ticity problem in a home energy monitoring network. Particularly,
the smart plug which collects and reports the energy value can po-
tentially be compromised to falsify the power consumption before
reporting it to smart meter.
We presented a solution to mitigate these attacks, and thus ensur-
ing the provenance of the energy data reported by a secure smart
plug to the smart meter. A prototype was implemented and we
conducted security and e!ciency analysis. We have shown that the
proposed system is feasible to be deployed on low computational
power devices hence demonstrated its practicality.
While the proposed solution is built on a public-key based so-
lution for a scalability consideration of supporting newly added
veri"ers, a future work will be investigating the use of a message
authentication code (MAC) based solution for single veri"er and
multiple veri"er cases. In the future, we expect to work with a more
e!cient secret sharing scheme and use general access structure.
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